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NO. 23 MARCH 2021 Introduction 
The Corona Debt Conundrum 
in the Eurozone 
Limits to Stabilisation by Monetary Policy and the Search for Alternatives 
Paweł Tokarski and Alexander Wiedmann 
One of the most serious economic and social consequences of the pandemic is the 
higher public debt of the Eurozone countries. The massive interventions of the Euro-
system have lowered borrowing costs to record lows. For some time to come, the 
sustainability of the public finances of the most indebted Eurozone countries will 
depend on expansionary monetary policy. However, this approach raises questions. 
It is uncertain how long monetary policy can support the debt market of the EU-19, 
whether there are effective alternatives, and what impacts the high debt levels and 
the interventions of the European Central Bank (ECB) will have on the foundations 
of the Eurozone. 
 
The Corona pandemic has hit Europe hard. 
In many states, public life was – and in 
some places continues to be – almost com-
pletely shut down. Businesses have had 
to close and curfews have been imposed. 
Consequently, the Corona crisis has also 
been a major shock to the European econo-
my. The member states of the Eurozone had 
no choice but to massively counteract the 
collapse of some economies. With liquidity 
assistance, they have been trying to support 
the population groups and economic sec-
tors most affected by the crisis. To make 
these state interventions possible, the Euro-
pean Commission activated the general 
escape clause of the Stability and Growth 
Pact. These support measures were neces-
sary and continue to be so. Without them, 
unemployment in the Eurozone would 
have increased even more and many com-
panies would have had to fear insolvency. 
All this would have had devastating social 
consequences, especially for the poorest. 
At the same time, the states would face a 
financing problem because the number 
of employees subject to social security con-
tributions, and thus tax revenues, would 
fall and social spending would increase. In 
addition, there would be higher expendi-
tures on health care. However, the states 
can, at best, try to mitigate the consequences 
of the crisis, but they cannot prevent an 
economic collapse as European economies 
have experienced the largest recessions in 
decades. Those euro area countries still 
struggling with the aftermath of the euro 
crisis, including high public debt levels, are 
at the same time particularly affected by 
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the pandemic, as the vital tourism sector 
in southern Europe has largely come to a 
standstill. Falling economic growth, com-
bined with higher government spending 
levels, has caused government debt to rise. 
According to European Commission fore-
casts, in 2021 the debt ratio in France will 
rise to around 118 per cent of gross domes-
tic product (GDP) – compared to 98 per 
cent in 2019 – and in Italy even to 160 per 
cent. For Spain, the Eurozone country most 
affected by the Corona crisis, an increase of 
26 percentage points to 122 per cent of GDP 
has been predicted. In Greece, the debt level 
will reach the 200 per cent mark. There, 
public finances are also under pressure 
from military spending. Not even Germany 
still meets the Maastricht criterion of 60 per 
cent of GDP, as its debt ratio is now 70.1 per 
cent (see Figure 1). 
The negative fiscal impacts of the pan-
demic will be exacerbated in 2021 by the 
need to maintain restrictions on the econo-
my, at least until the second quarter. On 
the other hand, the cost of servicing public 
debt in euro area countries is still at near 
record lows. The reasons for this are the in-
terventions of the Eurosystem, which con-
sists of the ECB and the 19 national central 
banks of the Eurozone. For this purpose, a 
special purchase programme was launched, 
mainly for government bonds (the pan-
demic emergency purchase programme, 
PEPP). Can rising government debt never-
theless become a pressing problem for the 
Eurozone? 
Growing Public Debt and the 
Stability of the Eurozone 
Already since the 1970s, public debt has 
been growing in the developed European 
economies. The introduction of the euro 
helped to lower interest rates on govern-
ment bonds and put government debt on 
a sustainable path. However, the global 
financial crisis and the euro crisis caused 
the debt-to-GDP ratio to rise again signifi-
cantly in most euro area countries. Now the 
current pandemic has caused debt to reach 
record levels. This raises questions about 
debt sustainability and the stability of the 
euro area. However, the view on govern-
ment debt is also changing. Unlike in the 
previous Eurozone crisis, no actors can be 
blamed today for the excessive debt due 
to their misconduct. Rather, the increased 
public debt resulting from the Corona pan-
demic serves to mitigate its enormous nega-
tive economic and social impacts and to en-
able a quicker return to economic growth. 
The question for the post-Corona period 
is whether the rapid growth of public debt 
will be a challenge for recovering econo-
mies. Previously, it was said that with debt 
ratios above 90 per cent of GDP, rising 
government debt would have particularly 
negative consequences for future economic 
growth, as private investment would be 
crowded out and public finances burdened 
by debt-servicing costs. Many Eurozone 
members, including Greece, Italy, France, 
Spain, and Portugal, have far exceeded this 
level. However, as debt-servicing costs are 
currently low, the problematic consequenc-
es of debt for public finances are also rather 
limited at the moment, as the pressure to 
cut other investment-enhancing govern-
ment spending is weak. 
To assess the risk of excessive public 
debt, it is not enough to calculate only the 
debt-to-GDP ratio. The main consideration 
should be whether the economy will be 
able to service higher levels of debt in the 
future, for example thanks to higher growth 
rates. What is important is whether its eco-
nomic model is flexible enough to adapt to 
new challenges such as digitalisation and 
green transformation. Future debt sustain-
ability also depends on the balance sheet of 
the public sector. This includes assets such 
as shares in state-controlled enterprises and 
financial assets, but also (especially long-
term) liabilities. It should be noted that the 
negative consequences of the Corona crisis 
for public finances will only become appar-
ent later. In many countries, they will mani-
fest themselves, for example, in poorer 
demographic development, including sharp 
declines in birth rates. This may cause 
implicit debt to rise, for example costs for 
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health care, social care, and the pension 
system. Unfavourable in this context are 
the prospects of highly indebted euro area 
countries such as Italy, Portugal, and Greece. 
There, the old-age dependency ratio – that 
is, the ratio of the over-65s to the 20 to 
64-year-olds – is rising in a worrying way. 
The higher the public debt levels, the 
more sensitive public finances are to the in-
creased servicing of their costs. In the event 
of a downturn, fiscal policy-makers would 
be faced with a dilemma between stabilis-
ing the business cycle and debt sustainabil-
ity. Finally, if the government is no longer 
able to meet some or all of its debt obliga-
tions on time, it risks losing access to finan-
cial markets. Currently, the entire debt sus-
tainability of the over-indebted Eurozone 
countries is based solely on the expansion-




Source: European Commission 
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ECB to the Rescue: 
Risks and Alternatives 
With the announcement of the €1,850 
billion PEPP, the ECB has implicitly com-
mitted itself to keeping government bond 
interest rates low. So far, the ECB’s strategy 
has been successful, as member states can 
currently finance their debt at record low 
levels. Even the recent political crisis in 
Italy has not led to an increased premium 
on Italian government bonds. The crucial 
question is how long the ECB can continue 
to stabilise the Eurozone debt market. The 
ECB’s Governing Council has announced 
that the purchase of government bonds will 
last until at least March 2022, when the 
Covid-19 crisis phase is over and the capital 
payments due from government bonds will 
be reinvested by the end of 2023. However, 
it is hard to imagine that the asset purchas-
es will be stopped in the final phase of the 
presidential elections in France in 2022. 
Moreover, the economic consequences of 
the pandemic, such as higher debt and un-
employment levels, will require monetary 
and fiscal policy support for much longer. 
Inflation is the key factor in determining 
whether the ECB can support the Eurozone 
debt market for a longer period. As long 
as inflation remains well below the ECB’s 
target (below but close to 2 per cent), it can 
justify its accommodative monetary policy. 
Otherwise, it would have to choose between 
the monetary policy target and the stability 
of the monetary union. Currently, inflation 
in the euro area is at a low level. It is true 
that the five-year inflation swaps – an indi-
cator of inflation expectations – have risen 
steadily in recent months. But whether 
inflation will really grow significantly and 
come close to the ECB target is disputed 
among economists. 
Another kind of challenge is the situa-
tion in the US market. The recent plans 
of the US government for a massive fiscal 
stimulus package caused the interest rates 
of US bonds to skyrocket. As a result, Euro-
pean bond rates also rose. This will force 
the ECB to buy more expeditiously and per-
haps detach the purchases from the ECB’s 
capital key, which it officially abandoned 
with the PEPP but has been trying to adhere 
to (see Figure 2). 
Risks of the ECB’s Involvement 
However, the strategy of basing Eurozone 
debt stabilisation on monetary policy could 
also entail risks for the Eurozone. One 
major problem is the distribution of risk in 
the Eurosystem. This is highly decentral-
ised, and part of the risk is the responsi-
bility of the participating central banks. 
Similar to previous public-sector asset pur-
chase programmes, the PEPP is character-
ised by limited risk sharing. This covers 
only 20 per cent of the purchases of govern-
ment bonds under the PEPP. The bulk of 
the risks are borne by the national central 
banks. The Italian central bank, for exam-
ple, has to buy mostly Italian securities on 
the secondary market, taking on the entire 
risk. If a central bank holding a large quan-
tity of national sovereign debt had to accept 
losses, the continued participation of this 
bank in the Eurosystem would be in ques-
tion. 
Another, more significant problem is the 
danger that the ECB – if it owns a signifi-
cant part of a state’s debt – intervenes as 
an actor in national politics. This could 
encourage reckless behaviour by national 
actors due to economic disincentives (moral 
hazard). Even if market pressure was not 
a decisive factor for long-term structural 
reforms, it was useful in keeping govern-
ments on the reform path. Once the ECB 
owns a large part of a country’s public 
debt, the government there could not only 
reverse structural reforms. In an extreme 
case, it could loosen public fiscal policy, 
knowing that the ECB will intervene in the 
debt market to avoid a possible destabilisa-
tion of the entire Eurozone. However, a 
massive show of financial support for the 
euro debt market would again raise legal 
questions – for example about the limi-
tation of purchases per issuer or about the 
ECB’s capital key – as the ruling of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court in 
May 2020 showed. A similar legal problem, 
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namely the need for the ECB to specify the 
concrete time horizon of its intervention, 
would arise if the bonds purchased under 
the PEPP were extended indefinitely by the 
Eurosystem, thus constituting a kind of 
“perpetual debt”. 
Possible Alternatives 
The question is whether there could be an 
alternative solution to stabilise the Euro-
zone debt market. It is hardly likely that 
the GDP of the most indebted states will 
grow fast enough to reduce their debt 
levels. Even before the pandemic, growth 
rates in the Eurozone were modest. An-
other way to reduce government debt is 
through restructuring. Bonds of euro area 
members are issued under national law, 
and the recent reform of the collective 
action clauses in bond covenants has made 
restructuring easier. However, in the case 
of Italy, where domestic investors buy the 
bulk of government bonds, this could desta-
bilise the financial system, as investors 
such as banks would be forced to accept 
the losses. Another option would be to take 
advantage of the fact that the government 
bonds were issued under national law. This 
could be changed, for example, to extend 
the maturities of bonds (local law advan-
tage). However, such a move would trigger 
very negative reactions in the financial 
markets and drive up the financing costs of 
other highly indebted Eurozone countries. 
In recent months, the suggestion has 
often been made, especially in France, that 
the ECB should go further in supporting 
public finances, and that all Corona-related 
public debt bought by the ECB should be 
cancelled. Even though Article 123 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union does not directly prohibit monetary 
financing, debt cancellation by the Euro-
system would be contrary to the spirit of 
the Treaty. Such a precedent could make 
investors who buy government bonds fear 
that the bonds they hold will one day also 
be cancelled. This would inevitably lead 
to higher interest rates on the debt. Such 
Figure 2 
 
 Source: ECB 
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a solution is also likely to encourage the 
tendency towards moral hazard. Instead 
of initiating difficult structural reforms on 
their own, the highly indebted countries 
could continue to expect the ECB to cancel 
their debts. Therefore, this option should, 
at best, be considered as a last resort for 
possible extreme cases, for instance if the 
current pandemic proves to be permanent. 
This would require a profound restructur-
ing of the sectors affected by the pandemic 
and would cause debt to rise dramatically 
once again. 
Another proposal is to involve the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism (ESM) in debt 
stabilisation. This instrument could take 
over the portion of the bonds bought by the 
Eurosystem, and thus enable an exit from 
expansionary monetary policy. However, 
such a solution would contradict the cur-
rent model of ESM operations, which con-
sists of granting financial aid to certain 
member states only under strict conditions. 
If the ESM is to be involved in debt stabili-
sation, the ESM Treaty, which lies outside 
the EU legal system, would have to be 
amended. Such a solution would have to 
be agreed by all members and ratified by 
all national parliaments. In order for this 
instrument to play a more important role 
in stabilising the debt market, it would first 
and foremost have to be removed from 
the direct control of the member states and 
made into an EU institution. At present, 
this is difficult to imagine. 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy As the 
Core of the Stabilisation Strategy 
The euro area will have to deal with high 
levels of debt among its member states for 
a long time. Current projected levels are 
likely to rise further in many of the EU-19 
countries as the pandemic continues and 
vaccination progresses more slowly than 
expected. It is not only higher levels of 
spending and lower revenue streams that 
will put more pressure on public finances. 
The need for public support for the banking 
sector, among others, may also contribute 
to the increase in debt. The banking sector 
is likely to be hit hard by the pandemic 
because of problems in the real economy. 
The extent of such difficulties will be re-
vealed by the stress test coordinated by the 
European Banking Authority. The results 
of the test are expected at the end of July 
2021. 
Currently, there is no effective alterna-
tive to debt stabilisation through monetary 
policy, which allows member states to focus 
on fighting the pandemic. Under current 
conditions, it is crucial to continue active 
fiscal policy at least until 2023 to support 
the post-pandemic recovery. It is also im-
portant that Germany maintains an active 
fiscal policy for as long as possible. A quick 
return of the largest economy in the Euro-
zone to normal growth rates could help 
other member states. 
It is also essential to limit the use of 
monetary policy in the debt market as 
much as possible so as to encourage re-
sponsible economic policy-making of the 
member states. It is important to use public 
resources effectively to combat the effects 
of the pandemic in order to maintain 
labour force participation and create a 
broader basis for economic growth through 
productive investment. Above all, invest-
ments should be made in human resources, 
especially digital skills. Only faster eco-
nomic growth offers the chance for stabili-
sation, and possibly debt reduction. Spend-
ing efficiency is important, especially in the 
case of the reconstruction fund. It is the net 
contributors who assess it. If the countries 
most affected by the pandemic fail to use 
EU funds effectively for growth-enhancing 
stimulus and structural reforms, they will 
face the same problems after the pandemic, 
but with much higher public debt levels. 
Particular attention should be paid to how 
Italy uses the reconstruction fund. The new 
government under former ECB chief Mario 
Draghi offers a good chance that these 
funds will be planned and used effectively. 
On the other hand, Italy’s medium-term 
political outlook is a cause for concern, 
especially as a right-wing populist coalition 
is expected in the next elections. All this 
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is likely to have a negative impact on the 
country’s fiscal stability. It is also likely to 
dampen the willingness of other euro area 
countries to engage in further fiscal inte-
gration. 
In terms of debt management, govern-
ments of the most indebted euro area coun-
tries should make the most of the current 
low interest rate environment to issue debt 
with the longest possible maturities. This 
would help ensure the sustainability of 
public finances in the face of short-term 
fluctuations in financial markets. 
Prospects: Foundations of the 
Eurozone under Pressure 
The stabilisation of public debt will be one 
of the most pressing issues on the euro area 
agenda in the coming years. It will influ-
ence two important debates on the founda-
tions of the monetary union: the design of 
the current fiscal policy framework and 
the review of the ECB’s monetary policy 
strategy. 
Rising debt levels challenge existing fis-
cal rules. In most of the cases, public debt 
levels will be far higher than the Maastricht 
reference value of 60 per cent of GDP. There-
fore, it is in doubt whether this framework 
is tenable. Examples are the rule adopted in 
2011, which requires an annual reduction 
of the debt ratio by one-twentieth of the dif-
ference between the actual debt ratio and 
the 60 per cent threshold, or the limitation 
of the budget deficit to 3 per cent. Although 
there is undoubtedly a need to make the 
fiscal rules in the Eurozone more realistic, 
it does not seem to be a good idea to start 
this discussion now. Due to the unfavoura-
ble political situation (elections will take 
place in Germany in 2021, in France in 
2022) and very different positions, it would 
hardly lead to a constructive solution. 
It would be best to extend the currently 
valid general escape clause of the Stability 
and Growth Pact at least until the end of 
2022. However, sooner or later, Germany 
will also have to face a discussion on re-
forming the fiscal rules. In addition to the 
long-proposed simplification, the rules 
will have to be based less on specific bench-
marks and be tailored more to the situa-
tions of specific economies, their business 
cycles, and their systemic importance for 
the stability of the euro area. However, this 
“individualisation” of fiscal rules risks fur-
ther politicising them. The high level of 
debt and the need to relieve the Eurosystem 
of the task of stabilising it will necessitate a 
partial post-Corona debt mutualisation. The 
Eurozone – in its current form as a fiscally 
decentralised monetary union – is vulner-
able to debt crises in its most indebted mem-
ber countries. Such crises can quickly trig-
ger a domino effect throughout the Euro-
zone. Before any joint issuance, however, 
plans for the post-Corona period must be 
accompanied by discussions on how sustain-
able the economic models of the southern 
euro countries are, and what conditions 
should apply to reforms. 
Rising government debt will also largely 
determine the current debate on the ECB’s 
monetary policy strategy. The main ele-
ments of this strategy – such as the defini-
tion of the inflation target, the way infla-
tion is measured, and the monetary policy 
horizon – will also have a major impact 
on the Eurosystem’s ability to stabilise debt. 
It would be beneficial if monetary policy 
were given more flexibility in supporting 
economic policy, as is the case worldwide 
today. Monetary policy alone, however, will 
not be able to permanently stabilise the 
euro area as long as the most glaring struc-
tural deficits persist in the largest euro area 
countries. In the short term, the ECB faces 
the challenge of stabilising interest rates on 
the sovereign debt of Eurozone members. 
Indeed, after the announcement of the US 
fiscal stimulus package, these interest rates 
were sharply increased due to rising US 
bond yields. In the longer term, the ECB 
will have to master an even more difficult 
task. It is a matter of intervening in debt 
stabilisation while keeping national fiscal 
policy from dominating supranational 
monetary policy. 
Dr Paweł Tokarski is a Senior Associate in the EU / Europe Research Division. 
Alexander Wiedmann worked as an intern in the EU / Europe Research Division. 
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